16-Civ-A6 Highway Design, Construction, and Maintenance · December 2015
Nivaar worked solution (AI-drafted; not reviewed by a licensed engineer)
Paper format: 98-Civ-A6 Transportation Planning & Engineering, National Examination, December 2015. Seven questions, each of equal value (20 marks); any five constitute a complete examination. Closed book, one two-sided aid sheet permitted. Three hours. All seven questions are solved below as a study resource.
Reference texts. Mannering, Washburn & Kilareski, Principles of Highway Engineering and Traffic Analysis (Wiley); Papacostas & Prevedouros, Transportation Engineering and Planning (Prentice Hall); Roess, Prassas & McShane, Traffic Engineering (Pearson); Ortúzar & Willumsen, Modelling Transport (Wiley) for the demand-model chapters (trip generation, distribution, mode choice, assignment).
Question text not reproduced: the examination questions are © Engineers and Geoscientists BC. Open the official past paper (linked at the top of this page) to read the question, then follow the worked solution below.
Given. Parallel routes with linear volume-delay functions $t_i=10+20(V_i/C_i)$ and a fixed total demand.
| Highway | Capacity $C$ (veh/h) | Travel-time function |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | 2,200 | $t_1=10+20\,V_1/2200$ |
| 2 | 3,000 | $t_2=10+20\,V_2/3000$ |
| 3 (part b) | 2,800 | $t_3=10+20\,V_3/2800$ |
| Total demand $Q$ | 8,000 veh/h | |
Find. UE volumes and travel times with two routes (a) and three routes (b); an explanation of Braess’ paradox (c).
Approach. At Wardrop user equilibrium every used parallel route carries equal travel time. Because each free-flow term is the same (10 min), equal travel time forces equal $V_i/C_i$; letting that common ratio be $k$, the flow-conservation equation $\sum V_i=Q$ solves directly.
(c) Braess’ paradox. User equilibrium is selfish: each driver minimises only their own travel time, ignoring the congestion externality they impose on others. When a new link is added to a general network, it can offer individual drivers a tempting shortcut whose use loads a shared, congestion-sensitive segment more heavily. At the new equilibrium every driver is still individually best-responding, yet the extra loading on the shared link can make the common travel time higher than before the link existed. The system optimum and the user equilibrium do not coincide, so adding capacity does not guarantee improvement. In this particular problem the three highways are fully independent parallel routes with no shared bottleneck, so the paradox cannot arise and the added capacity strictly helps.
| Case | $V_1$ | $V_2$ | $V_3$ | Travel time |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| (a) Two routes | 3384.6 | 4615.4 | — | 40.8 min |
| (b) Three routes | 2200 | 3000 | 2800 | 30.0 min |