23-Ind-A2 Analysis and Design of Work · May 2015
Nivaar worked solution (AI-drafted; not reviewed by a licensed engineer)
National Exams — May 2015 — 98-Ind-A2 Analysis and Design of Work. Three-hour, closed-book exam (approved Casio/Sharp calculator only); any five of the seven questions constitute a complete paper and only the first five answered in the answer book are marked — all seven are solved below for completeness. The source’s marking-scheme line for Question 3 mislabels its final sub-part “(ii)” a second time instead of “(iii)”; it is answered here in the natural (i)/(ii)/(iii) order that matches the question text itself, 5/5/10 marks.
Reference texts: Niebel & Freivalds, Niebel’s Methods, Standards, and Work Design (13th ed.) — operations analysis, workplace/tool design and motion economy, stopwatch time study, performance rating and allowances, predetermined time systems (MTM/MOST), work sampling, wage-incentive and job-evaluation systems.
Question text not reproduced: the examination questions are © Engineers and Geoscientists BC. Open the official past paper (linked at the top of this page) to read the question, then follow the worked solution below.
The point system rates every job against a common set of compensable factors and converts the total points into a pay rate, and it is installed through the following steps: (1) select and train a job evaluation committee representative of management and, where applicable, labor; (2) select a set of benchmark (key) jobs that span the full range of work and pay levels in the plant, since these anchor the whole scale; (3) select the compensable factors (typically skill, effort, responsibility and working conditions, each with sub-factors) and define a fixed number of graduated degree levels for each factor; (4) assign point values (weights) to each factor and to each degree within it, reflecting the factor’s relative importance; (5) write or update accurate job descriptions and specifications for every job to be evaluated; (6) evaluate each job by rating it against the degree scale of every factor and summing the points; (7) construct a point-to-money conversion (wage) curve by plotting the benchmark jobs’ existing pay against their point totals and fitting a line/curve through them; (8) group jobs with similar point totals into pay grades or classes; and (9) install, communicate and maintain the plan, including a formal review/appeal procedure for jobs whose evaluation is disputed.
Companies install wage incentive plans to increase output and productivity per labor-hour, reduce unit labor cost even after the incentive payout, improve equipment/capacity utilization, raise morale and earnings for workers willing to produce more, reduce the need for close supervision (the pay system itself motivates pace), and help attract and retain the most productive workers.
Incentive plans most often fail because of: loose or inaccurate time standards (Question 4(ii)) that let operators earn excessive bonus for ordinary effort, provoking management to “cut the rate,” which then destroys trust in every future standard; quality and safety erosion when operators are paid purely for speed with inadequate quality control; poor production support — material shortages, machine breakdowns and planning failures beyond the operator’s control that make it impossible to earn the incentive through no fault of the operator; plans too complex for operators to understand or verify their own pay, which breeds suspicion regardless of whether the plan is technically fair; and failure to keep standards current with method, tooling or material changes (Question 4(ii)), so the incentive drifts away from the actual work content over time.
(a) Piecework. The operator is paid a fixed rate per unit produced (often with a guaranteed base/day rate as a floor), so earnings are directly and continuously proportional to output. It is simple to understand and strongly motivating, but it requires a separately computed price rate for every distinct job, ties pay very tightly to the accuracy of the underlying standard, and can encourage quality or safety shortcuts if not paired with strong inspection.
(b) Standard hour plan. The operator is paid their hourly rate for the number of standard hours the completed work represents, regardless of how many actual hours it took — so a job with a 1.0-hour standard finished in 0.8 actual hours pays for 1.0 hour. Earnings therefore rise in direct proportion to performance above 100% of standard, expressed simply as a ratio of standard-to-actual hours rather than as a per-job piece price.
(c) Measured day work. The pay rate itself is adjusted periodically (e.g. quarterly) based on the operator’s demonstrated performance level over the preceding review period, but stays fixed during that period regardless of day-to-day output swings — earnings are stable within a period while the rate level still reflects a genuinely measured history of performance.
The standard hour plan is the most commonly used direct financial incentive in industry, because a single set of time standards (already required for planning and costing, Question 2(ii)) can be applied across a highly varied mix of jobs without computing and maintaining a separate piece-rate price for each one, while still rewarding performance above standard in direct, easily verified proportion — combining piecework’s strong incentive with far lower administrative overhead in a typical multi-product plant.
