22-Elec-B7 Power Systems Engineering · December 2014
Question 5 of 7: Consequences of Short Circuits, and a Mid-Line Three-Phase Fault
Nivaar worked solution (AI-drafted; not reviewed by a licensed engineer)
Notes on this paper
Paper format. National Exams,
December 2014 — 07-Elec-B7 Power Systems Engineering. Open book, three hours,
any non-communicating calculator permitted. Seven problems; the paper states that any
five constitute a complete paper and that only the first five appearing in the answer
book are marked, and that all questions are of equal value.
All seven are solved here, because the set is a study resource rather than a
sitting.
Reference texts.
M. E. El-Hawary, Electrical Power Systems: Design and Analysis, rev. ed.,
IEEE Press/Wiley — the source of this paper's notation and method: the ABCD
two-port and long-line model, the two-reaction salient-pole machine, per-unit
transformer modelling, the linearised load flow, sequence networks and the equal-area
criterion.
J. D. Glover, T. J. Overbye and M. S. Sarma, Power System Analysis and
Design, 6th ed., Cengage — transmission-line parameters and the long-line
model (Ch. 4–5), power flow (Ch. 6), symmetrical faults (Ch. 7), symmetrical
components and unsymmetrical faults (Ch. 8–9), transient stability (Ch. 11).
J. J. Grainger and W. D. Stevenson, Power System Analysis, McGraw-Hill
— network reduction, sequence networks and fault calculation.
S. J. Chapman, Electric Machinery Fundamentals, 5th ed., McGraw-Hill
— transformer losses and equivalent circuits (Ch. 2), synchronous machines
(Ch. 4–5).
Canadian practice: CSA C22.1 Canadian Electrical Code Section 10
(grounding and bonding), CSA C22.3 No. 1 Overhead Systems, CSA Z462
Workplace Electrical Safety (arc-flash energy from the fault currents
computed here), and IEEE Std 142 for industrial system grounding.
Question 5 (Problem 5): Consequences of Short Circuits, and a Mid-Line Three-Phase Fault (5 + 10 + 10 points)
Part (a) — consequences of short-circuit faults.
A short circuit collapses the impedance between the sources and the fault point, so
the immediate consequence is a current of five to twenty times rated flowing from
every machine that can reach the fault. That current does mechanical and thermal
damage first: the electromagnetic forces between adjacent conductors and between the
turns of a transformer winding scale with the square of the current and can distort
or tear windings and busbars in the first few cycles, while the $I^{2}t$ energy melts
contacts, vaporises conductors at the arc root and ignites insulation. An arcing
fault releases enough energy to constitute an arc-flash hazard to anyone working
nearby, which is why Canadian practice under CSA Z462 requires the incident energy to
be calculated from exactly this fault current.
The system-wide consequences matter as much. The bus voltages collapse over a wide
area — as this problem shows, the healthy buses of a meshed network fall to a
third or a half of nominal — so motors stall or drop out, sensitive process
loads trip, and the reactive demand of recovering motor load makes the depression
worse. Generators lose their ability to export electrical power while the turbines
keep delivering mechanical power, so the machines accelerate; if the fault is not
cleared before the critical clearing time they pull out of step, which is the subject
of Problem 7. Unbalanced faults inject negative-sequence current that heats generator
rotors, and zero-sequence current that flows in the earth and couples into
communication circuits. Finally, every fault stresses the protection: a mis-graded or
slow scheme turns a local fault into a cascading outage.
Given. A three-bus network in which generator 1 (0.2 p.u.) reaches bus 1 through a 0.125 p.u. transformer and generator 2 (0.15 p.u.) reaches bus 2 through a 0.035 p.u. transformer; line 1–2 is 0.225 p.u. and lines 1–3 and 2–3 are 0.24 p.u. each. Both source voltages are 1.0 p.u.
Given data
Quantity
Symbol
Value
Generator 1 / transformer 1 reactance
xG1, xT1
0.2 and 0.125 p.u.
Generator 2 / transformer 2 reactance
xG2, xT2
0.15 and 0.035 p.u.
Line 1–2
x12
0.225 p.u.
Line 1–3
x13
0.24 p.u.
Line 2–3
x23
0.24 p.u.
Prefault voltage at both sources
E
1.0 p.u.
Fault
—
bolted three-phase, mid-point of line 1–3
Find. The bolted three-phase fault current at the mid-point of line 1–3, and the voltages at buses 1 and 2 during that fault.
Figure 5 — single-line diagram for the three-phase fault study, with the fault point F at the mid-point of line 1–3.
Figure 6 — reducing the faulted network to a single Thevenin reactance seen from F: collapse the radials, then transform the (1, 2, N) triangle.
Approach. Reduce the network to a single Thevenin reactance seen from the fault point using one delta-to-star transform, then back-substitute the current division to recover the bus voltages.
Part (b) — collapse the two radial branches.
Each machine and its transformer form a single series path from the common source
node N to its bus:
$$\begin{gathered}x_{N1}=0.2+0.125=0.3250, \\ x_{N2}=0.15+0.035=0.1850\end{gathered}$$
Splitting line 1–3 at its mid-point creates the fault node F, so the fault sees
0.120 p.u. towards bus 1 and, through the remaining half plus line 2–3,
$$x_{F\text{-}3\text{-}2}=0.120+0.24=0.360$$
towards bus 2. Bus 3 is a passive junction and disappears into that sum.
Transform the (1, 2, N) triangle to a star.
The three nodes 1, 2 and N are joined in a delta by line 1–2 and the two radial
branches, and the fault current has to pass through it. With
$\Sigma=x_{12}+x_{N1}+x_{N2}=0.7350$,
$$\begin{gathered}Z_{1}=\dfrac{x_{12}x_{N1}}{\Sigma}=0.0994898, \\ Z_{2}=\dfrac{x_{12}x_{N2}}{\Sigma}=0.0566327, \\ Z_{N}=\dfrac{x_{N1}x_{N2}}{\Sigma}=0.0818027\end{gathered}$$
Combine the two arms and add the common branch.
The fault now sees two parallel routes to the star point, and the star point reaches
the source node through $Z_{N}$:
$$\begin{gathered}\text{arm A}=0.120+Z_{1}=0.2194898, \\ \text{arm B}=0.360+Z_{2}=0.4166327\end{gathered}$$
$$\begin{aligned}&X_{th} \\ &=\dfrac{(\text{arm A})(\text{arm B})}{\text{arm A}+\text{arm B}}+Z_{N}
\\ &=0.1437563+0.0818027=\boxed{j0.225559\ \text{p.u.}}\end{aligned}$$
Fault current.
With a bolted fault the terminal voltage at F is zero and the prefault voltage is
1.0 p.u., so
$$\boxed{I_{F}=\dfrac{1.0}{jX_{th}}=\dfrac{1.0}{j0.225559}=-j4.433429\ \text{p.u.}
\;\;(\,|I_{F}|=4.433429\ \text{p.u.})}$$
An independent bus-impedance-matrix inversion of the same five-branch network returns
$Z_{FF}=j0.225559$ to six figures, which confirms the hand reduction.
Part (c) — back-substitute for the star-point voltage.
The fault current flows out of the source node through $Z_{N}$ first, so
$$\begin{aligned}V_{N'}&=1.0-I_{F}Z_{N} \\ &=1.0-(4.433429)(0.0818027) \\ &=0.637333\ \text{p.u.}\end{aligned}$$
It then divides between the two arms in inverse proportion to their reactances:
$$\begin{gathered}I_{A}=\dfrac{V_{N'}}{\text{arm A}}=2.903704, \\ I_{B}=\dfrac{V_{N'}}{\text{arm B}}=1.529725\end{gathered}$$
and the two add back to 4.433429 p.u., which is the fault current again — a free
check on the division.
Bus voltages under the fault.
Each bus sits one star arm away from the star point, carrying its own share of the
current:
$$\begin{aligned}V_{1}&=V_{N'}-I_{A}Z_{1} \\ &=0.637333-(2.903704)(0.0994898) \\ &=\boxed{0.348444\ \text{p.u.}}\end{aligned}$$
$$\begin{aligned}V_{2}&=V_{N'}-I_{B}Z_{2} \\ &=0.637333-(1.529725)(0.0566327) \\ &=\boxed{0.550701\ \text{p.u.}}\end{aligned}$$
Both are real because every element is a pure reactance and both sources were taken
at the same angle. The arithmetic closes on itself: continuing from bus 1 through the
0.120 p.u. half-line gives $0.348444-(2.903704)(0.120)=0$, which is the fault point, and
the same is true along the other route. For completeness the same substitution gives
$V_{3}=0.183567$ p.u.